周波：龙象相处之道在于保持安全距离

2018年6月1日，我应英国国际战略研究所（IISS）邀请，在其主办的“香格里拉对话会”的一场主题为"中印关系中的竞争与合作 "的特别会议中发言，会议恰好就在印度总理莫迪的大会主旨演讲之前。另一位发言嘉宾是印度人民党全国总书记拉姆·马达夫（Ram Madhav）先生。我惊讶地发现，我们在发言中都十分强调合作而非竞争，就好像这两篇不同的演讲稿是出自同一人之手。

然而，（2020年）6月15日发生在中印边境实际控制线沿线加勒万河谷地区的事件却是另一番景象。继4月以来紧张的军事对峙之后，一场夹杂着拳头、石块和棍棒的中印士兵冲突导致20名印度军人死亡。中方强调，加勒万河谷位于实际控制线的中国这一侧，但未提及己方伤亡人数。中国指出冲突事件的导火索是印度边防部队擅自进入中国境内修筑工事及路障。印方则称事件起因为中方人员擅入印度境内。

冲突爆发的一个根本原因是实际控制线的模糊性。正因如此，自上世纪80年代以来边境争端几次凸现也就不足为奇了，尽管没有一次像6月的冲突事件那样致命。公平地说，为避免冲突，中印两国政府都做出了很大努力。自1993年至今，两国在政府和军队层面至少达成了五个边界协议，但悬而未决的难题始终是缺乏共同认定的实际控制线。例如，根据1993年的协定（《中华人民共和国政府和印度共和国政府关于在中印边境实际控制线地区保持和平与安宁的协定》），“双方的一切活动不得超过实际控制线。如果一方人员越过实际控制线，在另一方提醒后，越线人员应立即撤回到实际控制线本方一侧。”然而，如果双方人员连实际控制线在哪里都不知道，又如何“撤回”到本方一侧呢？

这种令人左右为难的局面在一定程度上是由于中印两国在处理边界问题上采取的不同方式。北京的想法是自上而下，即倡议双方先就争议领土问题达成互谅互让的原则，再核查实际控制线的走向；印度的处理方式则更偏向于自下而上，即先核查实际控制线，再谈其他问题。从这两种对立做法的角度来看，为什么迄今有关实际控制线问题的谈判收效甚微就不难理解了。同样，这也解释了为什么新德里对于已经在印度实际控制之下、却被北京宣称是中国领土的藏南地区（即所谓“阿鲁纳恰尔邦”）的谈判毫无兴趣。两国在处理边界问题时唯一的成就似乎是在任何情况下都不向对方开枪的默契，正如莫迪总理两年前在接受《印度斯坦时报》采访时指出的那样， “在过去40年里，印中边境上，双方没有向对方开过一枪”。

如果说“不开火”的原则意在避免将矛盾升级为致命冲突，那么加勒万河谷的冲突大大削弱了双方在这一原则上的共识。亚洲最大的两支武装力量为避免枪击，转而采用最原始的方式，以拳头、石块互相攻击，令人难过。更具讽刺意味的是，这些士兵很可能就是过去不曾为边界纠纷而忧心，兴高采烈地参加对方国庆节或军人节庆祝活动的同一批军人。

加勒万河谷事件为双方提供了一个重新考虑采取何种措施平息冲突的机会。这可以包括彼此保持安全距离、不在对方已占领土上修筑任何设施、以及在处理危机至关重要的军事指挥部之间建立热线。

加勒万河谷的致命冲突给我们的启示及其引发的更大问题有哪些呢？这起系列事件中发生的最新事件，令北京怀疑印度对中国的态度已经发生变化，思考印度增长的敌意可能会导致什么后果。在此之前，2017年的中印军队洞朗对峙事件，即是由于中方在三国交界附近的洞朗修筑道路所致。即使印方认为该地区主权属于不丹而非中国，也绝不应该与中国军队在他国领土上展开长达73天的对峙。当被问及“印方从洞朗对峙事件中学到了什么”时，时任印度国防部长阿伦·贾特利回答说：“2017年的印度早已不是1962年的印度”。中国发言人简练回应：“中国也一样。”

与之相关的问题是，美国已明确将中国定义为“首要战略竞争对手”，印度会在多大程度上与美国为伍？尽管德里声称奉行不结盟外交政策，近年来印度却不断向美国靠拢。印度是“四方安全对话”（QUAD）——还包括美国、澳大利亚、日本等其他三国——的成员之一。尽管“四方安全对话”中的任何一国都不会承认这一机制是针对中国的，但它提倡的所谓“自由、开放的印太地区”不过是蒙在真实目的之上的一层薄纱。2019年1月，在新德里举办的“瑞辛纳对话”（Raisina Dialogue）上，一位中国学者曾向印方发言人提问：“如果印太真的是自由开放的，那么‘四方安全对话’可以接受中国成为一员吗？”听众的反应是一阵爆笑。

因此，中国必须自问， 如果美国变得越来越敌意， “四方安全对话”将如何演变？印度又将在其中扮演怎样的角色？

印度一些战略专家长期以来一直暗示，中国想从北部边境及南部的印度洋区域“包围”印度，或许还将借助巴基斯坦的一臂之力。2008年底，中国海军开始在亚丁湾和索马里盆地进行反海盗巡逻以来，这种担忧开始升级，印度对中国最终可能在印度洋建立“珍珠链”的军事基地的疑虑，无异于为“包围论”火上浇油。事实上，中国没有任何必要包抄印度。中国的经济体量约为印度的五倍。与印度国防工业不同的是，中国的国防工业体系几乎可以自主生产中国人民解放军所需要的一切装备，就整体军力而言，试图追赶美军的中国人民解放军只会把印度军队远远甩在后面。

“珍珠链”观点备受印度媒体的追捧。这个名词在2005年被首次提出，但迄今这个被大肆炒作的“珍珠链”却杳无踪迹。中国只在2017年在吉布提建立了一个后勤补给基地，以支持其在印度洋的反海盗行动。

中国和印度都自称为发展中国家。对中国来说，没有什么目标比实现“中华民族伟大复兴”更有雄心壮志了，这也被描述为“中国梦”，类似于莫迪政府的“新印度”蓝图。同样有趣的是，中国的“一带一路”向西发展，而印度的“东向行动”则向东延伸。

加勒万河谷冲突事件是不幸的，但不应构成中印关系恶化的分水岭。相反，它应带来有用的警示：要想龙象相安无事，共存之道是保持安全距离。

中国论坛何怡宁译自2020年8月5日《海峡时报》，韩桦校译

Sino-India Ties and Lessons from the Galwan Valley Brawl

On June 1, 2018, I was invited by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the organiser of the Shangri-La Dialogue, to speak at a special session entitled “Competition and Cooperation in China-India relations” right before Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s keynote speech. The other panelist was Mr Ram Madhav, the National General Secretary of the Indian Bharatiya Janata Party.

I was surprised to find how we both focused on cooperation rather than competition as if the different speeches were written by the same person.

But what happened on 15 June at Galwan Valley along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between China and India is a far different story. Following tense military standoffs since April, a brawl involving fists, rocks and wooden clubs between Chinese and Indian soldiers left 20 Indian servicemen dead.

Without mentioning the number of its own casualties, China stressed that the Galwan Valley was located on the Chinese side of the Line of Actual Control. It added that the trigger for the brawl was Indian border troops trespassing into China’s territory to build fortification and barricades. The Indian side claims it was the Chinese who were the trespassers.

A root cause of the problem is the fuzzy nature of the LAC. It is not surprising then that boundary disputes have flared up on several occasions since the 1980s although none has been as deadly as the June encounter.

It’s fair to say both governments have made great efforts in avoiding conflict. Since 1993, at least five border agreements have been made, both at governmental and military levels, towards this end. But as always the challenge remains the lack of a commonly agreed LAC.

For example, according to the 1993 Agreement: “No activities of either side shall overstep the Line of Actual Control. In case personnel of one side cross the Line of Actual Control, upon being cautioned by the other side, they shall immediately pull back to their own side...” But how could they pull back to their side of the LAC if they don’t even know where the line actually lies?

Such a Catch-22 situation is in part the result of the different approaches taken by China and India to resolve the border problem. Beijing’s way is top-down — to propose that both sides should, as a starting point, agree to the general principle of mutual accommodation of the disputed territories before verifying the alignment of the LAC; But India’s approach is more bottom-up, that is, to verify the LAC first before talking about anything else.

Seen from the perspective of opposing approaches, it explains why so far negotiations over LAC have made little headway. Similarly it explains why New Delhi has shown no interest in negotiations over Arunachal Pradesh that is already under India’s control but claimed by Beijing as Chinese territory.

The only achievement seems to be a tacit understanding of not shooting at each other under any circumstances. As Prime Minister Narendra Modi noted in an interview with the Hindustan Times two years ago: “Over the last four decades, not a single bullet has been fired across the India-China border”.

But if the intent of the ‘no shooting’ guideline is to avoid escalation to a deadly conflict, then the fatal Galwan Valley episode has greatly undermined that understanding. It is sad to see the two largest armed forces in Asia, in an attempt to avoid shooting, turn instead to the most primitive methods of fist fights and stone throwing. Ironically, these same soldiers could very well have been the same people who in the past have happily joined the other side for national day or Armed Forces Day celebrations despite the border disputes.

The incident provides a chance of reconsidering what measures both have to take to deconflict. This might include keeping a safe distance from each other, not building any facilities on territories taken by the other side as its own and establishing hot lines between military commands that are critical in a crisis.

What are the takeaways and bigger issues raised by the deadly brawl in Galwan Valley?

For Beijing, it is the latest of recent incidents that leaves it wondering about India’s changing attitudes towards China and where the growing animus might lead. Prior to this there was the 2017 military standoff over Chinese construction of a road in Doklam near a trijunction border area, known as Donglang in Chinese. Even if India believes Doklam is Bhutanese rather than Chinese territory as China claims, it should not step into a faceoff with China on foreign territory that lasted for 73 days.

When asked what lessons India might learn from the Doklam standoff, then Indian defence minister Arun Jaitley said: “India of 2017 is different from India of 1962.” The Chinese spokesman’s pithy reply : “So is China”.

The related question is, to what extent will India side with the United States, which has clearly marked China as its primary strategic competitor?

Although Delhi is said to pursue a foreign policy of non-alliance, in recent years India is shifting ever closer to the US. India is part of the so-called “Quad” — a group that includes the US, Australia and Japan. None of the Quad members would admit it is against China, but their promotion of a free and open Indo-Pacific is a thin veil of their true intent. At the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi in January 2019, a Chinese scholar asked the Indian panelists: if indeed the Indian-Pacific is free and open, could Quad accept China as a member? The response is a burst of laughter from the audience.

So, China has to ask itself, if the US grows ever more hostile, how will the Quad evolve? And what role will India play in it?

Some Indian strategists have long suggested that China wants to “encircle” India from the border in North and the Indian Ocean in South and perhaps with the help of Pakistan. Such worries, fuelled by a concern that China may eventually establish “a string of pearls” of military bases in the Indian Ocean, have grown particularly wild after the Chinese navy started anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin at the end of 2008.

There is no need for China to encircle India. China’s economy is five times larger than India’s. Unlike the Indian defence industry, the Chinese defence industry is capable of indigenously producing almost everything the People’s Liberation Army wants. In terms of the overall military strength, the PLA that is trying to catch up with the US can only leave the Indian military further behind.

The “String of Pearls” was particularly well-received in the Indian media. But 15 years after the term was first coined in 2005, the much hyped garrotte is nowhere to be seen - there is just one Chinese logistic base in Djibouti and that was built in 2017, in support of its counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean.

Both China and India describe themselves as developing countries. For China, no objective is more aspirational than realising “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. This, described as “China dream”, is similar to Mr Modi government’s “New India” blueprint. It is also interesting to see China’s “Belt & Road” goes west while India’s “Act East” extends to the east.

The brawl in the Galwan Valley is unfortunate, but it should not be made out to be some kind of watershed that redefines China-India relations for the worse.

Rather, it works better as a useful reminder: Before the dragon and the elephant figure out a way to stay in the same room, the art of co-existence is to keep a safe distance.